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I. INTRODUCTION
Many real properties are mortgaged. Most of these mortgaged
properties are insured. There is no mystery to either of these proposi-
tions. However, the relationship between the two can be somewhat mysti-
fying at times, giving rise to questions about the rights and duties of insur-
eds, insurers and lenders. Most banks and other lending institutions
t J.D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law, B.A.; University of
Minnesota-Duluth, 1985.
1. SeeJohn W. Steinmetz et al., The Standard Mortgage Clause in Property Insur-
ance Policies, 33ToRT & INS. L.J. 81, 81 (1997).
2. See id.
3. See Stephen E. Goldman, Rethinking the Mortgagee's Position: Should the
1
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require that borrowers obtain insurance on the mortgaged property to
protect against various perils and risks.4 In most cases, the borrower or
mortgagor will obtain the required policy in her or his own name and
simply identify others (e.g., bankers, lenders and mortgagees) as secured
parties or parties with an insurable interest in the property.
In the event of fire, hail, tornado or a host of other perils, the in-
sured can make a claim against the insurer and receive the proceeds of
the policy.6 From these proceeds, one can make relairs or, in the case of
a total loss, pay down the mortgage and begin anew. But what happens if
the insured himself becomes the source of the peril? Arson and other in-
8
surance frauds are commonplace occurrences. Of course, most insur-
ance policies deny coverage when the loss is caused by the insured's inten-
tional acts.9 But where does this leave the lender or mortgage holder?
Because the property itself was the security for the loan, and the borrower
has been denied coverage, the lender now may be vulnerable. 0 Similarly,
what happens to other named insureds that have an interest in the now-
damaged property? If the proceeds of the policy have been denied due to
the fraudulent act of one insured, what rights, if any, do other co-insureds
have to the benefits of the policy?
Courts throughout the United States and Great Britain have wrestled
with these questions for centuries'I The resultingIbody of law is not al-
Mortgage Clause Be Revised, in THE STANDARD MORTGAGE CLAUSE: PROTECTING ALL
PARTIES 183, 184 (1987).
4. See Steinmetz et. al, supra note 1, at 81.
5. See 12 SIR WnimAM HoLuswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 540 (repub.
1966).
6. See GEORGE RICHARDS, RICHARDS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE 1-2 (Rowland
H. Long ed., 4th ed. 1932); see also 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY § 1.03[1], at 1-12
(Stephen A. Cozen ed., 1999) (noting that nearly any type of risk can be insured
against, save those limited by public policy restraints).
7. See generally 12 GEORGEJ. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 176:59 (Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 3d ed. 1997) (describing insured's options to re-
pair or rebuild as based on express policy language and intent of the parties to the
contract).
8. See Leane English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Co-Insured Spouse:
Three Theories on Recovery, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 849 (1983).
9. See 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1.03[1], at 1-13; see also
COMMITTEE ON PROPERTY INS. LAw TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, ANNOTATIONS
OF THE 1943 NEW YORK STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY AND EXTENDED COVERAGE
ENDORSEMENT 89-108 (2d ed. 1994). According to the committee report, virtually
every state in the U.S. has a statutory fire insurance policy that provides exceptions
for arson and other forms of fraud, misrepresentation and concealment by the in-
10. See generally Joshua Stein, Property Insurance: Lender's Hot Buttons in Loan
Closings and Administration, 442 PLI/REAL 725, 739 (1999) (noting the potential
risks to lenders of finding themselves unprotected against damage to their secured
interests).
11. See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
[Vol. 26:2
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ways clear or consistent. 2 However, the combined efforts of the Minne-
sota State Legislature and the Minnesota Supreme Court recently have
made progress in this regard.' s This article explores the evolution of
property insurance law and the resulting duties and obligations of insur-14
ers, mortgagors and mortgagees. This article also reviews recent devel-
opments in innocent co-insured law. Finally, this article argues that the
reasoning used by the Minnesota Supreme Court to protect innocent co-... .. , 16
insureds in Watson v. United Service Automobile Ass'n should be apPied to
similarly protect innocent lenders when mortgagees commit arson.
II. Loss PAYABLE CLAUSES
While the earliest forms of public fire insurance have existed since
the Middle Ages, it was not until after the Great Fire of London in 1666
that private fire insurance policies began to resemble modern policies.1s
The early policies were patterned after existing maritime and inland ma-
rine insurance models. 9 The form and legal standing of such policies fur-
ther evolved under the guidance of Lord Mansfield, a leader in the
development of commercial law in England.2° The first fire insurance
companies were established in the New World as early as 1735.2 1 The
Philadelphia Contributorship for Insurance of Houses By Loss of Fire,
22which Benjamin Franklin helped create in 1752, operates to this day.
Many principles of contemporary fire insurance are recognizable in
those early policies, albeit in rudimentary form. Then, as now, policies
included exclusions for fires caused by "usurped power" or "civil commo-
ENGLISH LAw IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 450-78 (1992) (summarizing the history
of insurance law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); see also infra Parts
II, III.
12. See generally Cerven, supra note 8, at 851 (noting that, in the case of inno-
cent co-insureds, "age-old tenet[s]" and "anachronistic views of the marital rela-
tionship ... have complicated the determination ... of the innocent spouse's in-
terests under the policy").
13. See Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 1997)
(applying for the first time in Minnesota a statutory approach to the question of
coverage for innocent co-insureds when another insured violates an express term
of the policy); see also MINN. STAT. § 65A.01 (1998) (establishing minimum cover-
age requirements for fire insurance policies).
14. See infra Parts II, IV.
15. See infra Part III.
16. 566 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1997).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See I INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1.03[1], at 1-9.
19. See 12 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 5, at 540.
20. See 1 OLDHAM, supra note 11, at 450.
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tion."'3 The insured then and now must have an insurable interest in the
24
subject property. Of particular long-term significance, under Lord
Mansfield, the courts came to view the insurance contract as uberrimaefi-• 25
dei, requiring utmost fidelity between the parties. These principles
crossed the Atlantic with the colonists and remain fundamental precepts• 26
of modem American insurance law.
A. Historical Development
Because many insured properties are encumbered by mortgages or
other security agreements, fire policies 2tpically afford some level of pro-
tection of the secured party's interest. In early instances, mortgagees
took out independent policies upon subject properties and paid premi-28
ums directly to the insurer. This method of protection proved problem-
atic, for several reasons: 1) mortgagees preferred not to absorb the addi-
tional cost of premiums; 2) mortgagees often lacked control over the
subject property and hence could not ensure that the conditions of insur-
ance were met; and 3) mortgagors generally could not receive any benefit
from such policies. 9
Mortgagees then began requiring that mortgagors obtain insurance
on the property with an assignment of the proceeds back to the mort-
gagee. This assignment came to be known as the loss payable clause.
3
1
Over time, loss payable clauses have been referred to alternatively as the
open mortgage clause, simple mortgage clause or the simple loss payable
clause. The assignment of loss payee status generally was established by a
designation on the declaration page or an endorsement to the policy in-
dicating that a loss, if any, was payable to the loss payee, as its interests ap-
23. See 12 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 5, at 540.
24. See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW § 196, at 388
(1932) (commenting on the reenactment of a 1746 statute "forbidding insurance
without insurable interest in the assured").
25. See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 536.
26. See I INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1.03[1], at 1-13 (describing
the requirement of insurable interest). See generally William T. Barker et. al., Is an
Insurer a Fiduciary to Its Insureds? 25 TORT AND INS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989) (asserting that
while insurers are not always required to act solely in best interests of the insured
and are not held to the strictest meaning of fiduciary, they must comport with
principles of good faith and fair dealing).
27. SeeJames R. Dwyer & Carey S. Barney, Analysis of Standard Mortgage Clause
and Selected Provisions of the New York Standard Fire Policy, in THE STANDARD
MORTGAGE CLAUSE: PROTECTING ALL PARTIES 1, 2 (1987).
'28. See RiCiirpiS, supra note 6, at 467-68.
29. See id. at 471.
30. See id. at 472; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 81-82.
31. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 81; see also Dwyer & Barney, supra
note 27, at 2.
32. See 4 CoucH, supra note 7, § 65:8.
[Vol. 26:2
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The loss payable clause also was problematic for mortgagees. As a
mere appointee of the insured mortgagor, the mortgagee's rights were• . 35
purely derivative. As such, the mortgagee was subject to the same de-
fenses and policy conditions as the insured mortgagor. Thus, if the pol-
icy was void due to an act of the insured such as fraud or arson, it also was
37
void as to the mortgagee loss payee.
Because the loss payable clause still carried more risk than many
lenders were willing to assume, a new form of the mortgage clause evolved
38
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 39 Now, this form is referred to
as the standard, union or mortgage clause. In 1894, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals became the first court to judicially review the standard
mortgage clause. 4°  In its decision, the court discussed both the
differences between simple and standard mortgage clauses and the
rationale underlying the evolution of the standard form:
We all know that [twenty] years ago a contract between a mort-
gagee and an insurance company, like that before us, was novel
and rare. At that time the customary method of indemnifying
the mortgagee against loss by fire was to indorse upon the policy
the words, "Loss, if any, payable to... mortgagee, as his interest
may appear," or words of similar import. T[od]ay such an in-
dorsement is rare, and a contract similar to the mortgage clause
before us is in general use. Why this change? The reason is not
far to seek. The old endorsement made the mortgagee a simple
appointee of the mortgagor, and put his indemnity at the risk of
every act or neglect of the mortgagor that would avoid the
original policy in his hands. Indemnity so precarious, so liable
to be destroyed by the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of the
mortgagors, was not satisfactory to the mortgagees; and they
proceeded to make contracts with the insurance companies
33. See id.; see also 5A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw
AND PRACTICE § 3401 (1970); 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01;
Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 82.
34. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
35. See 3 id.
36. See 46A CJ.S. Insurance § 1404 (1993); 4 COUCH, supra note 7, § 65:24; 3
INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01; RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 474.
37. See 45 CJ.S. Insurance §§ 595, 638 (1993); 4 COUCH, supra note 7, § 65:24;
3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01; see also Steinmetz et. al., supra
note 1, at 81-82 (stating that mortgagee's interest can be voided by mortgagor's
neglect).
38. See Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 3; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at
82.
39. See Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 3; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at
82; 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
40. See Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165, 173 (8th Cir. 1894).
20001
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similar to that before us, for the purpose of securing indemnity
to their interest that should not be affected by any act or negli-
gence of the mortgagors.4'
42
Thus, lenders finally found a reasonable level of protection. Other
courts soon recognized the standard mortgage clause as well.43
Courts consistently have held that the standard mortgage clause cre-
ates, in substance, two independent contracts of insurance: one between
the insured mortgagor and the insurer and another, completely separate
from the first, between the mortgagee and the insurance company. In
this case, a breach of one or more policy conditions by the mortgagor may
preclude benefits as to the mortgagor, but it will not affect the independ-
ent contract rights of the mortgagee. A mortgagor therefore can collect
the proceeds of the,6policy in spite of the wrongful or negligent acts of the
insured mortgagor.
B. The Contract Analysis Approach
Courts have looked to the language of the policy to determine if the
47mortgage clause is simple or standard in form. Some standard mortgage
clauses expressly provide that the mortgagee's rights "shall not be invali-
dated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within de-
scribed property." Because they form an independent contract, stan-
dard mortgage clauses also may create a duty upon the insurer to notify
the mortgagee of intent to cancel the policy. More recently, many short-
form or "easy read" standard mortgage clause contracts exclude the for-
mer language and courts interpret them as standard clause contracts
solely on the basis of the language indicating that the insurer has a duty to
41. Id. at 173-74 (citation omitted).
42. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
43. See Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Mortgage. Co., 35 So. 2d 352, 353
(Ala. 1948); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 29 So. 2d 712, 715
(La. Ct. App. 1947); H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401,
401-02, 19 N.W.2d 772, 773 (1945); B.X. Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.S.2d 14, 18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Third Nat. Co. v. Thompson, 191 S.W.2d 190, 192-93 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1945); Fire Ass'n v. Ward, 42 S.E.2d 713, 715-16 (W. Va. 1947).
44. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83; see also 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1404
(1993); 5A APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 33, § 3401; 4 CoucH, supra note 7, §
65:93; 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
45. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83 (citation omitted); see also 3
1!,4SUai,, rEAL r raoF , R .up u nuuic 6, § 52.01.
46. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83.
47. See 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1.04[2] [a], at 1-20.
48. Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83; see also 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 6, § 52.01.
49. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
[Vol. 26:2
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warn the mortgagee of its intent to cancel the policy. 5°
In either case, courts continue to look to the language of the con-
tract to determine the type of mortgage clause included. T  When the
courts find a provision that, as to the mortgagee, the policy will not be in-
validated by any act of the insured, or they find a policy requirement of
notice to the mortgagee of the insurer's intent to cancel, the courts will
hold that the policy includes a standard mortgage clause.52 Conversely,
when the mortgagee is identified merely as a loss payee, or the contract
states only that losses are payable to the mortgagee as its interests may ap-
pear, courts have interpreted the contract to contain a simple mortgage
clause.53 In virtually every jurisdiction, simple loss payees have been de-
nied benefits when the policy was found void due to the acts or negligence
of the insured.54
50. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 85.
51. See I INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 31.04[2] [a), at 1-20.
52. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 85.
53. See 45 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 595, 638 (1993); see also Delaware Ins. Co. v.
Greer, 120 F. 916, 917 (8th Cir. 1903). The true construction of the clause is:
Loss, if any, payable to, mortgagee as his interest may appear; or of words
of similar import, when attached to policies of fire insurance, is that the
mortgagee thereby made the simple appointee of the mortgagor, and
that his indemnity is at the risk of the acts and omissions of the latter
mortgagor's interest under the original policy.
Id; see also Orenstein v. Star Ins. Co. of Am., 10 F.2d 754, 757 (4th Cir. 1926) (stat-
ing that the open loss payable clause at issue had the effect of making the mort-
gagee the "simple appointee of the insured to receive the proceeds of the policy to
the extent of his interest") (citation omitted); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Liddell Co.,
60 S.E. 104, 106-07 (Ga. 1908); Gilman v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 92 A. 721, 721-
22 (Me. 1914); Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 146, 148-49, 208
N.W. 816, 816-18 (1926); Williams v. Pioneer Co-op. Fire Ins. Co., 171 N.Y.S. 353,
356 (N. Y. 1918); Wiggins v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 146 S.E. 216, 218 (N.C.
1929); Smith v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 202 P. 1088, 1090-91 (Or. 1922).
54. SeeCapital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F.2d 237, 243-44 (8th Cir.
1945). In Capital Fire Insurance Co., the court stated:
[W] here the insurance on the mortgaged property has been obtained by
the mortgagor, loss payable to the mortgagee as his interest may appear,
the insurer is not entitled to subrogation to the rights of the mortgagee
on payment of the loss to him, in the absence of a provision to that effect
in the policy.... In the absence of a subrogation clause in the policy of
insurance payable to the owner and the mortgagee, as their interests may
appear, a payment to the mortgagee is a payment pro tanto of the mort-
gage debt.
Id. In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co., 49 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir.
1931), the court stated:
2000]
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There is considerable conflict in the decisions on the question of recov-
ery by mortgagees. Undoubtedly the clause may be so drafted as to make
the loss payable to an assignee in any event, but such is not the case here.
The rule supported by the weight of authority is that where the clause is
in simple terms, as appears in the policy in suit, the assignee is merely
appointed agent of the insured to receive the money and he is bound by
any act of the insured that would forfeit the policy.
Id. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Ruddy, 299 F. 189, 196-97 (8th Cir.
1924), the court stated:
We think it the almost universal voice of authority that under such a
clause the mortgagee recovers only on the theory that he is the appointee
of the insured to receive the money, or a portion thereof. If the insured
cannot recover, he cannot recover. Smith & Bernard, original mortga-
gors, cannot recover, as they have parted with their insurable interest.
Iverson cannot recover, if he has likewise parted with his insurable inter-
est. Ruddy cannot recover, for the reasons we have hereinbefore set
forth. Hence the mortgagee cannot recover.
Id.; see also Delaware Ins. Co. v. Greer, 120 F. 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1903) (finding that
"insurance of a mortgagee under the customary clause, which reads, in substance,
'[I] oss, if any, payable to ... mortgagee as his interest may appear,' ceases if fore-
closure proceedings are instituted against the mortgagor, and the latter knows that
they have been commenced, at any time before the fire which causes the loss oc-
curs").
States such as Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wis-
consin have also held similar propositions. See, e.g., London & Scottish Assurance
Corp. v. Smith, 158 So. 892, 894 (Ala. 1935) ("A forfeiture by reason of complete
change of ownership without the consent of the insurer, so that the policy is no
longer in force in favor of the insured, defeats also the claim of his appointee.");
Southwestern Funding Corp. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 378 P.2d 361, 363 (Cal. 1963).
In Southwestern Funding Corp., the court stated:
However, it is our view that on the record before us and we consider both
its affirmative and its negative aspects; i.e., the stipulated facts and plain-
tiff's failure to show the language of the loss payable clause in its favor we
cannot hold that as a matter of law the evidence is not sufficient to sup-
port the trial court's findings and conclusions in favor of Motors Insur-
ance. For all that appears, the policy provided merely that the loss would
be payable to the lienholder as his interest might appear. The courts are
practically unanimous in holding that such a clause gives the beneficiary
thereof no greater right of recovery than that of the insured.
Id.; see also Southern Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 237 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) ("[W]hile the mortgagee's right of recovery under an indorsement on
a policy issued to the mortgagor containing a simple mortgage clause making the
loss payable to the former may be defeated by any breach of conditions by the in-
sured before the loss occurs, it cannot be defeated by an act of the insured after
the loss has occurred."); Brooker v. American Ins. Co., 16 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Ga. Ct.
[Vol. 26:2
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App. 1941). In Brooker the court found that the sale of the truck by the assured
"was a violation of the title and ownership" clause of the policy, and further, that:
Unless such sale and transfer of title was agreed to in writing by the in-
surer and this agreement added to the policy or unless the company con-
sented thereto and there has been a waiver of such written agreement to
the sale of the property by the assured by an authorized agent of the in-
surer or an estoppel in pais relative thereto, the policy was rendered void
by the sale of the truck by the assured, divesting herself of any insurable
interest therein.
Id. In Barwick v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 266 Ill. App. 574, 575 (1932), the
court recognized:
[I]t has been uniformly held that a loss payable clause, such as the one in
question, places the indemnity of the appointee at the risk of every act
and omission of the insured that would void, terminate or adversely affect
the insurance of the latter's interest under the policy, and that if the in-
sured is guilty of some breach of the covenants or clauses of the contract,
which the policy stipulates shall avoid the insurance, so that the loss is
not collectible by him, it likewise will prevent the appointee from recov-
ering upon the loss payable clause.
Id.; see also Carlile v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 254 N.W. 805, 806 (Iowa 1934) (find-
ing that "[b]y the terms of the policy, which were specifically made applicable to
plaintiffs by the loss payable clause, recovery could not be had for damage caused
through design of (building owner)"; Elmore v. Royal Ins. Co., 114 P.2d 786, 790
(Kan. 1941) ("The instant contract contains no exception which provides that the
insurer shall be liable to the mortgagee if the mortgagor commits an act of forfei-
ture after the loss occurs. In order for appellant to prevail we must read such an
exception into the contract. This[,] courts are not permitted to do.... ."); Farmers
& Depositors Bank v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Ky. 1950) ("A
breach of any condition of the contract by the insured owner that would prevent
recovery by him precludes recovery from the insurance company by the mortgagee
as his mere appointee to receive the money to the extent of its interest in the
mortgaged property."); State Say. Bank v. Shible Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 122,
124-26, 214 N.W. 926, 927-28 (1927) ("Owner's sale of property without consent of
township mutual fire insurance company held to prevent mortgagee from collect-
ing insurance, regardless of statute . . . ."); Ford v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 298 S.W.
741, 746 (Mo. 1927) ("It is regrettable that in this case the holders of bona fide
indebtedness should suffer because of the misdeed of an owner of the property,
but the mortgagee's interest being insured subject to a condition of the policy
covering this contingency, the insurer is not liable on breach of condition.");
Ramsey v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 139 S.W.2d 1027, 1029 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940)
(finding that "the policy became void as to insured because of the commencement
of foreclosure proceedings, it is also void as to the mortgagee who claims under an
open mortgage clause and whose rights are no greater than those of insured");
Malvaney v. Yager, 54 P.2d 135, 138-39 (Mont. 1936). In Malvaney, the court held:
Under such a mortgage clause, if loss occurs while the mortgage is in full
force and after the debt is due, the mortgagee is bound to collect the in-
surance money and apply it in full, or pro tanto, satisfaction of the debt,
20001
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and such payment amounts to satisfaction of the mortgage to the extent
of the payment; and if the mortgage debt be not due at the time of loss
and payment, the mortgagee shall hold the insurance money to dis-
charge the debt or payments as they fall due,
Id. (citation omitted) In Highway Trailer Co. v. Donna Motor Lines, Inc., 217 A.2d
617, 621 (N.J. 1966), the court stated:
We hold that where, as here, the insurer knows that the loss payee of a
theft insurance policy has a vital interest in the claim and by its conduct
leads the loss payee reasonably to believe that the claim has been ade-
quately presented, thereby lulling the loss payee into inaction, the in-
surer is estopped from asserting any defect in the presentation of that
claim.
Id.; see also Hessian Hills Country Club, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 186 N.E. 439, 441
(N.Y. 1933) ("Where, however, the contract of insurance is with the mortgagor,
and the undertaking to pay the loss to the mortgagee is collateral and dependent
upon the principal undertaking, the mortgagee cannot recover if there has been a
breach of condition of the policy by the mortgagor."); Wiggins v. Sun Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co., 146 S.E. 216, 218 (N.C. 1929) ("Upon all the evidence, plaintiffs were
not entitled to the equitable remedy of reformation of the policy. Without a ref-
ormation, we think it clear that they cannot recover on the policy."); New Jersey
Ins. Co. v. Ball, 165 N.E. 41, 43 (Ohio 1929) ("Condition in fire policy voiding in-
surance if other insurance covers risk held reasonable, unambiguous, and en-
forceable."); Haskin v. Greene, 286 P.2d 128, 138 (Or. 1955). In Haskin, the court
stated:
We think it unnecessary to set out the provisions which are relied on by
respondent's counsel and that it is sufficient to call attention to the fol-
lowing language appearing on the face of the policy: Assignment of this
policy shall not be valid except with the written consent of this company.
There is no claim that any such consent was ever obtained.
Id. In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Corp., 263 A.2d 448, 454
(Pa. 1970), the court stated:
The fire in this case was the result of arson by the owners (Tasso and
George Chronis) of the named insured (Silver Spur Company).... The
insurance companies are therefore not liable to the insured. In the ab-
sence of a stipulation in the policy giving to a creditor, who is made a
beneficiary-payee in the policy, higher rights than the insured owner, the
creditor's right to proceeds under the policy is derivative and limited to
the extent of the insured's right of recovery. Therefore, unless GECC can
come within some provision in the two policies involved protecting it de-
spite any act or neglect of the insured, it will be precluded from recovery
under these policies.
Id. In Central National Insurance Co. v. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp., 544 S.W.2d
362, 364 (Tenn. 1976), the court stated:
[TIhat the policy provisions, when coupled with the covenant by the in-
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The significance of this distinction hardly can be overstated, because
in cases of arson, fraud, concealment or misrepresentation, the mort-
gagee's rights under the policy will rise or fall with the determination of
the type of mortgage clause in the contract.5  The protection afforded
mortgagees under the standard mortgage clause is remarkably broad. 6
The clause indemnifies the mortgagee against specified perils, impermis-
sured in the chattel mortgage that he would keep the motorcycle insured
against loss by theft and that such loss, if any, should be payable to the
mortgagee, gave the mortgagee the right to receive the proceeds of the
policy to the extent of the debt owed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee
at the time of the loss; but that where the policy did not contain a union
mortgage clause, protecting the interest of the mortgagee from acts or
omissions of the insured mortgagor which, under the terms of the policy,
could operate to invalidate the coverage, the insured's failure to file a
sworn proof of loss and refusal to respond to repeated requests of the in-
surer that he make himself available for discussion of the alleged loss
barred the mortgagee from recovering on the policy.
Id. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Columbus State Bank, 442 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), the court recognized:
[W] here [the] policy stated that endorsements formed part of policy and
reference was made to endorsement, not attached to policy, which ex-
cluded coverage while automobile was being operated by mortgagor, and
endorsement was issued with intention on part of insurer and mortgagor
that it be part of policy, as between insurer and mortgagor endorsement
was validly included in policy and mortgagee could not recover under
loss payable clause for damage to automobile while it was being driven by
mortgagor.
Id.; see also Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Dyke, 165 A. 906, 907 (Vt. 1933)
(finding that mortgagee was merely insured's appointee, and insured's fraud pre-
cluded mortgagee from suing insurer); New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris Plan
Bank, 118 S.E. 236, 238 (Va. 1923) (holding that "[t]he right of the plaintiff here
is entirely derived from the assured Toler and it is clear to us that the contract has
been avoided by his action because of the additional insurance which he took out
in the National Union;" therefore, judgment in favor of defendant company). Fi-
nally, in Cary Manufacturing Co. v. Acme Brass & Metal Works, 254 N.W. 513, 515
(Wis. 1934), the court stated:
The failure of the plaintiff to provide by contract for the restoration in
the event of the destruction of the property by fire by applying the pro-
ceeds of the insurance puts it in a very disadvantageous position. The
court cannot by way of construction or in the exercise of equity power
remake the contract to fit the situation that now exists.
Id.; cf. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp. v. London S.S. Owners' Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 408 F.
Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (staying proceedings pending arbitration, in lieu
of directly denying benefits).
55. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.02[3].
56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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sible acts or negligence of the insured mortgagor and some acts of the in-
sured, such as policy cancellation. 57 Examples of acts which, under the
standard mortgage clause, have been held void as to the insured but not
as to the mortgagee include: 1) arson or intentional destruction of prop-
erty; 2) fraud or misrepresentation; 3) non-permitted procurement of
other insurance; 4) alienation of title or change of occupancy; 5) foreclo-
sure or initiation of foreclosure proceedings; 6) deed by mortgagor to
mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure; 7) increase of hazard; and 8) non-
payment of premium. 5
Even more indicative of the reach of standard mortgage clauses are
the many decisions holding that even material misrepresentations by the
insured prior to or at the incegption of the contract do not void the policy
ab initio as to the mortgagee. By contrast, the simple loss payable mort-
gage clause is as limited as the conditions and exclusions of the policy.6°
C. The Statutory Analysis Approach
By statute, the New York Standard Fire Policy specifies the form and
substance of fire insurance policies in that state. In 1943, the New York
Legislature amended the statute to include a version of the standard
57. See Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 12.
58. See id. at 13-15.
59. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01, (stating that such rep-
resentations "merely serve to abrogate coverage under the policy as to the mortga-
gor"); see also National Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Jamestown Mut. Ins., 334
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1000-01 (N.Y. App. Term. 1972); Young Men's Lyceum v. National
Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 163 N.Y.S. 226, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (holding that
"[t]he words of the clause 'loss shall be payable,' amount to a waiver by the
company, in favor of the mortgagee, of the effect of any prior or contemporaneous
act of the owner which would have a vitiating effect upon the policy") (emphasis
added). In Imperial Building & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Insurance Co., 166 S.E. 841, 842
(W. Va. 1932), the court stated:
We think the mortgagee, when a policy is presented to him with a stan-
dard mortgage clause attached thereto in his favor, is justified in assum-
ing that the insurance company has satisfied itself that the policy is valid
and free from impeachment for any conduct or act of the assured at its
inception or prior to the attachment of the mortgage clause.
Id. (citing Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Bally, 173 P. 1052 (Ariz. 1918)).
60. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01. Because a mortgagee
under.....-.. r;S cae -c'y s n'-. i a posuniti diivative of the
rights of the insured, he is controlled by the same policy exclusions and limitations
as the insured. See 3 id.
61. See COMMITTEE ON PROPERTY INS. LAW TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, su-
pra note 9, at 3 (providing a chart that gives the "manner by which the policy has
become standard" in different jurisdictions).
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mortgage clause.62 By 1951, every state in the U.S. enacted similar legisla-
tion, either requiring, or at the very least recommending, the use of some
version of the standard fire insurance policy. Today, ten states still use
the 1943 version of the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policz. Other
states have amended the form slightly, usually in style and layout.
Some states, including Minnesota, include within their standard fire
insurance forms an express statement that: "if this policy shall be made
payable to mortgagee... no act of any person other than such mortgagee
... shall render this policy void as to such mortgagee...."65 Other states,
such as New York, simply state that, "if this loss hereunder is made payable
... to a designated mortgagee not named herein as the insured, such in-
terest in this policy may be cancelled by giving to such mortgagee a ten
days' written notice of cancellation."
6
6
Although this phrase is less express than the Minnesota form, this
provision for notification of cancellation has been held sufficient to create
the independent contract status necessary to indicate existence of a stan-
dard mortgage clause.
Thus, the standard mortgage clause is recognized and available in
virtually all states. One commentator suggests that, "as a practical mat-
ter, the historical distinction between the simple loss payable clause and
the standard mortgage clause is declining in importance because mort-
gagees ... are almost universally insured under standard mortgage
clauses." However, a large body of case law, old and new, suggests oth-70
erwise.
D. Recent Cases and Holdings
1. Other Jurisdictions
The following examples of recent decisions in various state and fed-
eral courts interpreting loss payable clauses demonstrate that many juris-
dictions continue to apply the traditional simple loss payee reasoning,
62. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
63. See COMMrITEE ON PROPERTY INS. LAW TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION,
supra note 9, at 3.
64. See id.
65. Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 4 nn.8-9; see also MINN. STAT. § 65A.01,
subd. 3 (1998) (stating that only the mortgagee and vendor may act to void the
policy).
66. Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 4-5; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
38a-307 (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3404 (McKinney 1985).
67. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 85.
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69. Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 3.
70. See supra notes 53-54 for an extensive listing of cases and jurisdictions ad-
dressing questions of mortgagee loss payable status.
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rather than standard mortgage clause reasoning in reaching their deci-
sions.7 ' This reasoning frequently results in lenders finding themselves
unprotected.
In 1992, a New York bank listed as "loss payee" and not as "insured"
under policies insuring a consignor of gold bullion and jewelry was found
not entitled to proceeds of policies after insured property was lost. The
court ruled that, as a mere loss payee, the bank had no greater rights than
the consignor, who was deemed to have perpetrated a scheme to defraud
73
the insurance company.
In a 1983 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a
bank designated as a "loss payee" in a comprehensive policy issued to a
debtor could collect only so lonf as suspected arson on the part of the in-
sured could not be established.
7
The Louisiana Court of Appeals held in 1982 that a mortgagee
named as "loss payee" in the policy could not recover its interests in the
policy where the insured had settled independently with, and released
from liability, third-party defendants who caused the loss.
75
As recently as 1998, the Missouri Court of Appeals denied coverage
to the mortgagee of a sunken boat where the insured mortgagee misrep-
resented material facts to the insurer and the mortgagee bank had only a
simple loss payable clause. 76
In 1976, a Tennessee bank named in the policy as "mortgagee" was
unable to recover losses where the insured failed to file the required
sworn proof of loss form.77 The court determined that despite the bank's
designation as mortgagee, the policy contained a simple mortgage
clause.78
In 1972, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a creditor named "loss
payee" on the policy was unable to recover losses when the insured ab-
sconded with the covered yacht. 9
These are but a few examples. Recent cases from nearly everyjuris-
diction indicate that, contrary to at least one commentator's suggestion,8O
many policies for both real and chattel property continue to be written
71. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
72. See Ressler v. White, 968 F.2d 1478, 1478-79 (2d. Cir. 1992).
73. See id. at 1479.
74. See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 73, 75
(Mass. 1983).
75. See Howard Griffin, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 1262,
1263-64 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
76. See Central Bank v. First Marine Ins. Co., 975 S.W.2d 222, 225-27 (Mo. Qt.
Ann- 1QQRI
77. See Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp., 544 S.W.2d
362, 364 (Tenn. 1976).
78. See id.
79. See Fred v. Pacific Indem. Co., 494 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Haw. 1972).
80. See Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 3.
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with simple loss payee mortgage clauses."
2. Minnesota
Relatively few Minnesota cases have addressed the wrongful acts of
82
insureds as they affect the rights of innocent mortgagees. Nonetheless, a
careful review of the decisions suggests that the simple loss payee form ex-
ists, at least in theory, in Minnesota.
A frequently cited Minnesota decision is Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Insurance Co., from 1926.83 In this case, the court set the stage for fu-
ture judicial review of loss payable clauses when it considered whether the
purchase of other insurance by the insured (contrary to the conditions set
forth in the policy) voided the policy as to the mortgagee.8 The court
found language within the contract that indicated that no act of the in-
sured would void the policy as to the mortgagee, and held that the policy
contained a standard mortgage clause and ruled in favor of the lender.-
The court followed the general consensus view of simple and standard
clauses, noting that while the standard mortgage clause creates an inde-
pendent contract not voidable by the acts of the insured, the open (sim-
ple) loss payable clause makes the mortgagee a mere appointee to receive
86what otherwise would come to the mortgagor.
Little has changed in the ensuing seventy-three years. Minnesota
courts continue to review contract language to determine if the loss pay-
able clause is simple or standard.8 7 In the 1945 case of H.F. Shepherdson Co.
v. Central Fire Insurance Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
whether a previously terminated partnership between the mortgagor and
mortgagee nullified the mortgagee's status under the standard mortgage
clause.5 The insurance company argued that, as partners, the mortgagee
and mortgagor were agents of each other and as such, the plaintiff mort-
gagee was bound by the fraudulent acts of the mortgagor. The court
81. See supra notes 53-54; see also American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young,
329 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Minn. 1983). In reviewing an appellate decision regarding
the proceeds of an insurance policy on an airplane, the court explained that it
could not find a basis in case law or in secondary sources indicating that the stan-
dard mortgage clause did not apply equally to chattel property and real property.
See id.
82. See infra notes 83, 88, 92, 100.
83. See Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 146, 208 N.W. 816
(1926).
84. See id. at 818.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See infra notes 88, 92, and 100.
88. See H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401, 404, 19
N.W.2d 772, 773 (1945).
89. See id. at 405, 19 N.W.2d at 774.
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held for the mortgagee because the partnership had ended long before
the loss and ensuing claim. 0 More significant is that the court followed
the lead of Allen and used a contract theory analysis to determine the na-
ture of the loss payable clause.9
Continuing this trend and again relying heavily on Allen, the court in
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, construed a breach of war-
ranty clause in an insurance policy as a standard mortgage clause.92 When
Young, the insured mortgagor, took the insured property to Colombia, he
breached stipulations of the breach of warranty clause and the territorialS93
limitations of the policy. The Colombian authorities confiscated the• 94
plane for alleged drug trafficking. When the insurer challenged its li-
ability to the mortgagee, the court analyzed the language of the breach of
warranty clause, which read in part:
Loss, if any, under Coverage C shall be payable as interest may
appear to the lienholder named in Item 8 of the declarations
and this insurance as to the interest of the bailment lessor, con-
ditional vendee or mortgagee.., shall not be invalidated by any
act or neglect of the lessee, mortgagor or owner of the within
described aircraft... . Nothing herein contained shall be held
to vary, waive, alter or extend any of the terms, conditions,
agreements, or warranties of the below mentioned policy, other
than as above stated.
95
The insurer argued that the first portion of the clause was subordi-
nate to the second, resulting in a simple loss payee clause.96 The court dis-
agreed after analyzing the contract language and instead equated the
clause to the standard mortgage clause in the Minnesota Standard Fire In-. 97
surance Policy. The court then discussed traditional simple and stan-
90. See id. at 407, 19 N.W.2d at 775.
91. See id. at 406, 19 N.W.2d at 775 (citing Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 167 Minn. 146, 208 N.W. 816 (1926)).
92. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, 329 N.W.2d 805, 811
(Minn. 1983) (finding the insured property was an airplane).
93. See id. at 806.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 808.
96. See id. at 810.
97. See id. at 811. The court noted that the insurer's argument that the
breach of warranty clause was a form of hybrid open (simple) mortgage clause was
s.ci'-cfa0- . e d. The appart UILUuLJU LCC twCc III bt dlaubc, wi Ituni
in the language of a standard mortgage clause, and the second clause, which
stated that the former shall not vary, waive, alter or extend any of the other condi-
tions of the policy, was ambiguous. See id. The court chose to reconcile the dis-
crepancy by interpreting the second clause as referring to and limiting any sepa-
rate, later insurance issued to the mortgagee. See id. However, the court took
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dard loss payee principles, quoting Allen at length. Ruling that the
breach of warranty clause essentially was a standard mortgage clause, the
court held that the acts of the mortgagor did not void the policy as to the99
mortgagee.
In Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. Khosa, Inc., the Minnesota
Court of Appeals ruled against a property owner named as a simple loss
payee in a property insurance policy. Under the terms of the lease
agreement, the tenant, Khosa, Inc., was to pay the real estate taxes on the
property.101 When Khosa fell behind in making payments, the property
owner, Tigner, brought an unlawful detainer action.10 2 On the evening
prior to the unlawful detainer hearing, Khosa removed personal property
and fixtures from the leased premises, resulting in significant physical
damage.'03 Northwestern National, the insurance company, brought a de-
claratory judgment action to determine its obligations, if any, to Khosa
and Tigner.
Khosa's lease agreement with Tigner required that Khosa obtain• ..105
property insurance naming Tigner as an additional insured. The policy,
however, identified Tigner as a simple loss payee, with losses payable to
the loss payee "as interests may appear." 10 6 The policy excluded coverage
to the insured for dishonest or criminal acts by the insured and for wear
and tear from normal use. °7 Northwestern asserted that it was not liable
to Tigner under both exclusions, stating that Khosa's removal of property
in order to avoid attachment was either dishonest or unlawful. North-
western argued alternatively that damage resulting from such a move con-
stituted routine wear and tear.1 09 Northwestern further claimed that it was
not liable to Tigner under the loss payable clause because Tigner's rights• . , . 110
were purely derivative of Khosa's rights.
The district court granted summary judgment against Khosa, who
failed to appear at the trial court hearing. Having determined that
pains to point out that under the principle of contra preferentum, the case could also
have been resolved in favor of the insured mortgagee on the basis of the ambigu-
ity. See id. at 811 n.2.
98. See id. at 810.
99. See id. at 811.
100. 520 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
101. See id. at 772.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 772-73.




108. See id. at 773-74.
109. See id. at 774.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 773.
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Khosa had no claim against Northwestern, the court then granted sum-
mary judgment against Tigner as well.1 12 On appeal, the court discussed
the differences between simple loss payable provisions and standard
mortgage clauses." 3 The court determined that the policy did in fact in-
clude a simple loss payable clause and agreed that Khosa had made no
claim against Northwestern." 4  The court therefore ruled that "Tigner
ha[d] no right to assert the claim." 15
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has cited Allen as recently as 1997.116
In Bast v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., the insured and the insurer agreed to
change the coverage terms of an existing policy from replacement cost to
actual cash value. Neither party informed Bast, who held the contract
for deed on the subject property and was named loss payee in the pol-
icy. When the property suffered significant hail and wind damage, the
coverage was insufficient. 19 Taking its lead from Allen and Young, the
court employed a contract theory approach and found that the policy
contained sufficient language to create an independent contract between
the mortgagee and the insurer. On the basis of that contractual rela-
tionship, the court held that the insurer had a duty to inform the mort-
gagee of material changes to the policy.1
E. The Current State of the Law in Minnesota
Two patterns emerge from this review of current Minnesota case law.
First, in each of these cases, the courts have carefully applied a contract
theory approach in determining the loss payee status of the mortgagee.2
This result should come as no surprise because the principles of simple
and standard loss payee law are well established nationally.2 Further, the
contract theory analysis approach is also the majority approach. 124 The
112. See id.
113. See id. at 774.
114. See id. at 774-75.
115. Id. at 775.
116. See Bast v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 562 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
117. See id. at 26.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 27-28. The court simply accepted the district court's finding of a
standard mortgage clause because surprisingly, Capitol Indemnity did not appeal
that element of the decision. See id. at 27.
121. See id. at 28.
122. See Americmi Nat'I Bank & Tiust Cu. v. .. ung, 3.29 N.W.2Ud u05, o80iv-
(Minn. 1983); H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401, 405,
19 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1945); Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 Minn.
146, 149, 208 N.W. 816, 817 (1926); Bast, 562 N.W.2d at 26-27.
123. See supra notes 53-54.
124. See 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1 .04[2] [a], at 1-20.
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second pattern is more surprising, in light of the cases discussed from
other jurisdictions. 
12 5
In three of the four Minnesota cases cited, courts have ruled in favor
of the mortgagee (and the fourth was distinguishable, involving a property
owner rather than a mortgagee) 16 However, because Minnesota courts
follow the same contract theory analysis model used in other jurisdictions,
one may infer that Minnesota courts would yield similar results when
faced with similar fact situations. Given the precedential standing of Allen
and Young, and the appellate court's commentary in Khosa, the law ap-
pears settled that a mortgagee of real or chattel property identified only as
a loss payee would be viewed by the courts as a simple loss payee, subject• 127
to the same defenses as the insured. What is less certain is that such an
outcome is either equitable or desirable.
When lenders, mortgagees and other secured parties require that
mortgagees procure casualty insurance identifying the lenders, mort-
gagees and other secured parties as loss payees, they seek to protect their
secured interests.128 They are no less concerned with protecting their in-
terests from the acts or neglect of the mortgagor than from any other
peril.12 This concern is the very reason for the advent of standard mort-
gage clauses.! 3 Yet more than 100 years later, mortgagees continue to
find themselves unprotected by the very policies that they insisted their
1 31
mortgagors procure.
Several undesirable results followed. First, mortgagees suffered sig-
nificant losses, because they based their interest rate structures on a set of
assumptions that included adequate indemnification. 132 Even a cursory
review of cases nationally indicates that the issue is litigated all too fre-
125. See infra Part III.C.1.
126. See infra Part III.C.2.
127. See Alen, 167 Minn. at 149, 208 N.W. at 817. The court stated that:
When a policy contains a clause making the loss payable to the mort-
gagee as his interest may appear, sometimes called an open mortgage
clause, the mortgagee is a sort of conditional appointee to receive what
would otherwise come to the mortgagor, and if the mortgagor forfeit his
right to insurance, the loss payable clause is of no avail to the mortgagee;
but, under the union mortgage clause, the mortgagee has an independ-
ent contract with the insurer which is not affected by the future conduct
of the insuring mortgagor.
Id.; see also Young, 329 N.W.2d at 811 (indicating that Minnesota recognizes both
the simple and standard mortgage clause forms).
128. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01.
129. See Letter from Bruce Ulness, President, CornerStone State Bank, to au-
thor (Oct. 10, 1999) (on file with author).
130. See id.; see also Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 82.
131. See supra note 54 for an extensive list of cases holding against mortgagees.
132. See Letter from Bruce Ulness to author, supra note 129.
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quently. 13 In addition to burdening the courts, this litigation costs all of134
the parties time and money. Finally, these decisions may result in an135
inefficient distribution of losses throughout the economic system. The
efficacy of the contemporary insurance model is based on the remarkable
accuracy and efficiency of the actuarial method insurers use to predict
losses. As numbers of policies increase over time, the accuracy of actu-
arial models improves, enabling insurers to set premiums such that the
entire group will absorb an individual loss.
3 7
Thus, insurance companies are in the best position to accurately
predict risks and thereby distribute losses throughout the economic sys-• 138
tem most efficiently. A less attractive alternative would require lenders
to purchase their own policies.' s9 The lenders then would recover the cost
of premiums by charging increased interest rates.' 40 However, this again is
economically inefficient because borrowers still would be required to pur-
chase policies to protect their own interests in addition to paying higher
loan interest rates.
It is difficult to ascertain why mortgagees so often continue to be
identified as simple loss payees. In some instances, it may be simple inad-
142
vertence. Few courts have allowed equitable reformation of the policy
where the mistake was shown to be mutual and the intent of the parties
clear. 14  Beyond mutual mistake, it is difficult to imagine a valid reason
133. See supra notes 53-54.
134. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better
Way". Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J.
824, 830-31.
135. See generally Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The
Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 843 (1986) (discussing
the expected utility theory). See also 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, §
1.03[1], at 1-12 (explaining the insurer's role in predicting and distributing loss).
136. See Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74
B.U. L. REv. 109, 115-21 (1994) (explaining the actuarial process).
137. See Thomas D. Valentine, The Ratemaking Process, in FLORIDA INSURANCE
LAw 18 (1985).
138. See Wortham, supra note 135, at 843; see alsoJames M. Fischer, Why Are In-
surance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation ?: Text Versus Conten4 24 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 995, 1062 (1992). But see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Tran-
sitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509, 547 (1986) (arguing that in some circumstances di-
rect government compensation for some economic losses may be more economi-
cally efficient than the current insurance model).
139. See RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 467-71.
140. See id.
141. See Letter from Bruce Ulness to author, supra note 129.
142. See id.
143. See Esch v. Home Ins. Co., 43 N.W. 229, 231-32 (Iowa 1889); Norris v.
Monarch Fire Ins. Co., 177 S.W.2d 831, 833-34 (Tenn. 1944). But see First Nat'l
Bank v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 73, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying
Louisiana law; noting that it was unclear whether one of the parties ever had any
intent to include plaintiff in the insurance policy); Farmers-Merchants Bank &
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for insurers to issue simple loss payable policies on mortgaged proper-
ties. 1 " The policies clearly do not benefit either the mortgagee or the in-
sured mortgagor, but the policies tend to favor the insurer because they
eliminate the entire category of insured-caused risks. 145 Given that uberri-
maefidei, the utmost good faith, still is required of all parties to an insur-
ance contract, this result seems untenable. 1" Whatever the reason, poli-
cies continue to be issued identifying secured mortgagees as simple loss147
payees. Upon finding ambiguities in the contract, some courts apply the
principle of contra proferentum, interpreting the contract yainst the
drafter, ordinarily the insurer, in order to rectify this inequity.
Equitable reformation and contra preferentum are limited responses at
best. A better answer to the potential problem of under-indemnified
mortgagees is available in Minnesota. A recent groundbreaking decision
by the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the traditional contract the-
ory analysis and took a fresh approach to determining the rights of parties
to an insurance policy.' 49
III. INNOCENT CO-INSUREDS
In Watson v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, the Minnesota Supreme
Court joined Michigan, Georgia and Louisiana in taking a new approach
to the problem of innocent co-insureds, a group similar in several ways to
Trust Co. v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Corp., 553 So. 2d 1088, 1090-91 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that the remedy did not lie where the party seeking reformation
failed to show mutuality of intent to create a standard mortgage clause).
144. See Stein, supra note 10, at 739. Stein asks:
Why aren't these coverages automatically part of the basic policy? Why
should a lender and its counsel (or insurance advisors) have to go
through the trouble of remembering to check for these little added ex-
tras every time? In the view of the writer, this exercise merely creates a
potential pitfall for lenders and malpractice insurance companies, with
no corresponding benefit to anyone, even property and casualty insur-
ance companies.
Id.
145. See 45 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 595, 638 (1993); 4 CoucH, supra note 7, § 65:24;
3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at
82.
146. See 1 OLDHAM, supra note 11, at 456; see also 12 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 5,
at 540.
147. See supra notes 53, 54; see also supra text accompanying note 123.
148. See 1 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 1.04[2] [a], at 1-20 to 1-21.
The author also presents a general introductory analysis to ambiguity in insurance
contract interpretation. See id.
149. See Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 689-90 (Minn.
1997) (adopting a statute-based theory analysis for insurance contracts in addition
to the contract-based theory analysis).
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150
innocent mortgagees. Like mortgagees, innocent co-insureds typically.. ... 151
intend to be indemnified against all perils. Also like mortgagees, co-
insureds have, at most, limited control over the actions of other named
insureds.152 Finally, as courts eventually recognized, the relevant interest
at stake for both co-insureds and mortgagees in post-loss litigation was not
the interest in the property, but rather the interest in the proceeds of the
policy.
153
The fundamental issue in Watson was whether an innocent spouse
could be denied recovery when her estranged husband burned their
house to the ground; the policy included an exclusion barring recovery if
negligent or fraudulent acts of an insured caused the loss. This is a
typical innocent co-insured scenario and the courts have wrestled with
the competing interests for more than a century.
A. Histoical Development
For years, courts routinely denied coverage to innocent co-insureds
150. See id.; see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a fire insurance policy must conform to the statutory
fire policy); Osbon v. National Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (La. 1994)
(holding that a fire insurance policy must conform with statutory fire insurance
policy); Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 61-62 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (stat-
ing that liability insurance policies must "conform ... with statutory require-
ments").
151. See Reed v. Federal Ins. Co., 523 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 1988). The Reed
court reasoned that, "as a matter of fairness and equity ... the independent
wrongdoing of one insured should not bar recovery as to the coinsured under a
policy that names and is intended to protect her." Id. at 483 (emphasis added) (ci-
tations omitted).
152. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 855-56 (providing an example of the typical
innocent co-insured scenario where the insured couple is estranged and in the
midst of divorce proceedings). See, e.g., Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 685 (noting that
the innocent co-insured was not living in the insured premises at the time her es-
tranged husband set it on fire).
153. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 862. Because an insurance contract does not
insure the property itself, the analogy drawn between the interests in the property
and those under the contract is questionable. The proceeds of an insurance con-
tract are personalty and are held in the same way as "any personal property volun-
tarily acquired." Id. (citing Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 192 N.E.2d 20, 22 (N.Y.
1963) (other citations omitted)). Although the value of the insurance proceeds
and that of the property are similar, the proceeds of the insurance are not a substi-
tute for the property. See id.
154. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 685.
Coverage For An Innocent Co-insured Spouse, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434-35
(1997).
156. See Rachel R. Watkins Schoenig, Note, Property Insurance and the Innocent
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under a mixture of property, marital relationship and public policy theo-
ries. 5 7 Some courts found that, because the marital property was held in
joint ownership, the insurable interest wasjoint as well. This theory was
at times bolstered by the fact that the policy was issued in both spouses'
names. 5 9 In Rockingham Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hummel, the court noted
that the policy limitations applied to the "Named Insured" and that the160
named insured in this case was the marital entity. Thus, "[i]f either
spouse violated any one of [the contractual] duties, the breach was
chargeable to the "Named Insured" preventing either spouse from recov-
ering any amount under the policy.
" I
Other courts found significance in the marital relationship itself, stat-
ing that the interests of husband and wife were "inextricably intertwined"
and therefore, shared contract interests also should be considered "in-
separable."162 As joint tenants with joint and inseparable interests, mar-
157. See Marvin L. Karp, Arson and the Innocent Co-insured, 22 SPG-BRIEF 8, 9-12
(1993); Shoenig, supra note 156, at 895.
158. See, e.g., Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Ins., 619 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1980)
(holding that joint title and tenancy requires voiding of entire policy in case of
"fraud or false swearing" by the insured). The court in Short reasoned that three
bases existed for denying coverage to the innocent spouse. See id. First, each
spouse had ajoint obligation under the contract to protect and preserve the prop-
erty. See id. In its discussion of the neglect provision, the court tacitly asserted that
one spouse burning the house at least implied that the other failed in this contrac-
tual duty. See id. Second, when the property was jointly owned, an innocent in-
sured could not recover on a policy where ajoint co-owner willfully set fire to the
property. See id. The court stated:
Where, as here, the tide to the property is held jointly and that property
insured under a single policy and is destroyed by ajoint insured's act of
arson, the entire policy is voided under the first quoted contract provi-
sion declaring the policy to be void in the case of fraud or false swearing
on the part of the insured.
Id. Third, the court noted the great risk arson presents to the general public and
stated that it would be contrary to public policy to permit a member of the "entity"
which perpetrated the arson to collect the proceeds of the policy. See id.
159. See Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1979).
160. See id.
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1990) (citing Cer-
ven, supra note 8, at 858-62); see alsoJones v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Corp., 250
S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (holding that the plaintiff co-insured could
not benefit under the policy, even though she was divorced from the arsonist
spouse at the time of the fire), overruled by Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Under-
writers Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986). The Jones court reasoned that, be-
cause the couple was married at the time the policy was issued, the ensuing con-
tract was between the entity of husband and wife and therefore binding on both.
See id. The Texas Supreme Court has since overruled the Jones holding. See Ku-
lubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 954-55 (Tex.
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ried couples also were thought to share a joint duty to "save and preserve
the insured property. "16 Further, some courts feared complicity between
the spouses, finding it difficult to believe that one spouse could plan and
commit arson completely without the other's knowledge."
Finally, some courts expressed concern that the wrongdoer might
profit from his or her wrong, either directly or vicariously through his or
her spouse, contrary to public policy.16 5 Again, this notion was intermixed
with the other aforementioned theories. In Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Un-
ion Insurance Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "To allow recovery
on an insurance contract where the arsonist has been proven to be ajoint
insured would allow funds to be acquired by the entity of which the arson-.... . 166
ist is a member and is flatly against public po11c."
Over time, a recurrent pattern emerged. F requently, as in Watson,
the couple is estranged and in the midst of divorce proceedings at the
time of the arson. Uncomfortable with what seemed to be harsh and
inequitable outcomes, courts shifted their analyses away from these theo-
nes. In reconsidering the earlier theories, the courts came to doubt the
legitimacy of the analogy between property interests and interests in the
insurance policy.'
7 °
In Vance v. Pekin Insurance Co., the Iowa Supreme Court recognized
that "[p]roving divisibility of property interest may be difficult, if not im-
1986).
163. See Jones, 250 S.W.2d at 282.
164. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 851.
165. See Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Ins., 619 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1980). But
see Cerven, supra note 8, at 863 (suggesting that courts could easily prevent wrong-
doers from benefiting from the wrong by awarding the proceeds of the policy to
the innocent co-insured via a constructive trust).
166. Short, 619 P.2d at 590.
167. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 855-56.
168. See Lindahl, supra note 155, at 435. See, e.g., Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 384 A.2d 398, 402 (Del. 1978) (where the husband attempted to murder his
co-insured wife); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433 A.2d 1135, 1135-
36 (Md. 1981) (where the couple had experienced some marital problems and
had lived apart for several months in the year before the fire); Morgan v. Cincin-
nati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 53 (Mich. 1981) (where husband and wife were living
apart at the time of the fire); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 241 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (where the husband took his own life in the fire);
Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1283 (N.M. 1980) (where the wife had
moved out and was suing for divorce at the time of the fire); Kulubis v. Texas Farm
Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1986) (where the couple
was in the midst of divorce proceedings and were not living together at the time of
thec fire) Felc1- cr v. Nrth Rier " ns --- , 4- N..2 263 26 IWs -t App 1988).
(where the husband set the fire and then took his own life).
169. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 857-75; Karp, supra note 157, at 10-11.
170. See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1990) ("While the
value of the insurance proceeds and that of the property are similar, the proceeds
of the policy are not a substitute for the property.") (citation omitted).
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possible. This property rationale ignores the nature and extent of parties'
rights and duties as expressed by the insurance policy. " ' Further, the
contractual duties under the policies came to be viewed as several and
separate, rather than joint. 17 Other courts concluded that the wrongful
acts of one spouse could not reasonably be imputed to the other, absent
proof of complicity.' 7 Finally, courts conceded that barring recovery to
innocent co-insureds was "an inappropriate method of deterring crime
and preventing a wrongdoer from profiting from his or her own
.174
wrong.
B. The Contract Analysis Approach
In Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co., the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court moved away from these traditional approaches, rejecting the
notion that aT7olicy issued to co-tenants created a joint obligation under
the contract. Rather than looking at the relationship of the parties to
each other, the court found it more reasonable to focus on the construc-
tion of the language in the policy. The court stated:
Whether the rights of the obligees are joint or several is a ques-
tion of construction, and in construing an insurance contract
the test is not what the insurance company intended the words
of the policy to mean but what a reasonable person in the posi-
tion of the insured would have understood them to mean.
171. Id. at 592 (quoting Cerven, supra note 8, at 865).
172. See Steigler, 384 A.2d at 400-01; Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Warren,
390 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Molloy, 433 A.2d at 1140-41; Morgan,
307 N.W.2d at 55; McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 632, 637-38 (Miss. 1988);
Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 S.E.2d 170, 174 (N.C. 1981); Attalah v.
Midwestern Indem. Co., 551 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ohio 1988); McCracken v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co., 325 S.E.2d 62, 64 (S.C. 1985); Error v. Western Home
Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Utah 1988).
173. See Hosey v. Siebels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 753 (Ala.
1978) (holding that the insurance company may not deny coverage to an innocent
co-insured absent a finding that the innocent co-insured had set the fire, had
knowledge and authorized the setting or later ratified the arson); American Econ.
Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that our no-
tions of civilization are based on individual responsibility and accountability and
that it would be wrong to impose vicarious liability merely on the basis of the mari-
tal relationship). For the proposition that imputing the act of the arsonist-insured
to the innocent co-insured may violate the co-insured's rights to due process and
equal protection under the constitution, see Brief of Amicus Curiae, Michigan
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 266
(Mich. 1994); see also Steigler, 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1978).
174. Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis. 1982).
175. See Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121,122-23 (N.H. 1942).
176. Id. at 123
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While this case dealt with unmarried joint tenants, the move away
from a presumption ofjoint obligation and toward contract interpretation
opened the way to broad changes in rulings for all types of innocent co-.177
nsureds. It remained incumbent on the innocent co-insured, however,
to prove that his or her interest in the property was severable.' 7 Thus this
new theory, while looking in part to the language of the contract, did not
entirely abandon analysis under the joint property theory. 179 One com-
mentator has suggested that "[p]erhaps the opportunity to rebut the joint
contract presumption is a compromise between the desire to avoid a
benefit to the wrongdoer and the indemnification objectives of the insur-
ance contract."
18 °
A new approach, known as the "best reasoned rule," corrected the
deficiencies of both the older approaches and the rebuttable presumption
theory.'8s Disregarding entirely the question of whether the co-insureds'
interests in the property are joint, the NewJersey Supreme Court ruled in
Howell v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., that a spouse's fraud would not defeat
the claim of the innocent co-insured.'82 The court determined that liabil-
ity for fraud was itself several and separate, irrespective of the joint nature
of the property or contract interests. 85 The Howell court also noted that,
while not the controlling factor, ambiguities in the policy language sup-
ported the decision. i s Possible ambiguity later proved to be an important
element in the evolution of innocent co-insured law.'85 A number of
courts since have followed the best-reasoned rule and allowed recovery by
innocent co-insureds irrespective of the joint nature of the contract or
property interests. 6
177. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 864.
178. See id. at 864-65.
179. See id. at 865.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 865-66.
182. See Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1973).
183. See id. at 242.
184. See id. The court stated:
This conclusion is supported by the policy provisions prepared by defen-
dant carrier, even though we do not deem them necessarily controlling
here. The "Named Insured" is the husband "and/or" plaintiff wife. Al-
though the term "Insured" means the named insured, the use of the am-
biguous phrase "and/or" and the reasonable expectations of the insureds
by reason thereof compel a determination that the fraudulent conduct by
...... u .should not void dic policy as to the other who is completely
innocent thereof.
Id.
185. See Schoenig, supra note 156, at 899-900.
186. See Lindahl, supra note 155, at 441. A more common alternative used to-
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The Howell court noted that "[t]he unity of person of husband and
wife [expressed through tenancy by the entirety] gives no clue to the rela-
tionship that ought properly to obtain between the owners of the pro-
ceeds of insurance. In cases subsequent to Howell, however, it is not
clear whether courts focused entirely on the severable nature of the liabil-
ity for fraud or if they considered severability of the contract interests, as
in Hoyt.'ss Regardless, these decisions have essentially eliminated consid-
eration of property interests and the marital relationship as factors in in-
nocent co-insured cases.189
At the same time, courts have reconsidered their position on public
policy.' 90 Once property interests and antiquated concepts of the mar-
day examines co-insureds' obligations under the insurance policy, as opposed to
the co-insureds' property interests, to determine severability. See id. These courts
analyze the insurance contract's express language to determine whether the co-
insureds' obligations under the policy to refrain from fraud or arson are joint or
several. See id. For cases permitting recovery regardless of the nature of the prop-
erty ownership, see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kartsone, 510 F. Supp. 856, 858-59 (C.
D. Cal. 1981); Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400-01 (Del.
1978); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger, 366 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Warren, 390 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (111. App. Ct.
1979); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 139-40 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981); Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331-32 (Me.
1978); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Md. 1981);
Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981); Delph v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1285 (N.M. 1980); Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 409
N.Y.S.2d 85, 87-88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274
S.E.2d 170, 173-74 (N.C. 1981).
187. Cerven, supra note 8, at 867 n.113 (quoting Howell 327 A.2d at 144). The
court stated:
Both Howell and its progeny are unclear as to whether they focus on the
severability of the contract rights or the liability for fraud to determine
the innocent spouse's rights. If the courts were to focus solely on the fact
that the liability for fraud is separate, recovery would be permitted re-
gardless of the nature of the contract interests .... If contract interests
were the sole basis of recovery, then even if fraud was involved, the inno-
cent co-insured would not be entitled to recover where the contract in-
terests were not found to be joint. At any rate, the courts employ both
factors in holding that the innocent spouse is entitled to recover, thereby
reaching the most equitable result under the circumstances.
Id.
188. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 867; see also Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins.
Co., 29 A.2d 121, 123 (N.H. 1942).
189. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 867.
190. See Hildebrand, 386 A.2d at 331-32 (holding that the payment of policy
benefits of "insurance to indemnify an insured against the consequences of a viola-
tion of law by others without his or her direction or participation" did not violate
public policy) (citing Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Company v. Labrecht, 190 A.2d 420, 423
(N.H. 1963)); Reed v. Federal Ins. Co., 523 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1988) ("[A]s a
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riage relationship were removed from the determination, the public pol-
icy issue could be viewed in an entirely new light. In Wisconsin, the su-
preme court reasoned that married couples consist of two individuals each
of whom must be held responsible only for his or her own acts.'91 Like-
wise, it was held contrary to public policy and "our basic notions of fair
play and justice" to impose liability for fraud on an innocent person. 192
Later decisions note that the wrongdoer likely will not benefit from the
wrong in cases where the possibility does exist, and that the court has the
means available to mitigate that possibility.
193
Insurers then were left to deny benefits only when complicity could
be ascribed to both insureds-not an easy task.5 4 It is exceedingly diffi-
cult to prove arson and it is more difficult still to prove conspiracy to
matter of fairness and equity ... the independent wrongdoing of one insured
should not bar recovery as to the coinsured under a policy that names and is in-
tended to protect her."); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis.
1982) (reasoning that an absolute bar to recovery by innocent co-insureds was "an
inappropriate method of deterring crime and preventing a wrongdoer from prof-
iting from his or her own wrong").
191. See Hedctke, 326 N.W.2d at 740. The court noted that "imputing the in-
cendiary actions of an insured to the innocent insured and creating an absolute
bar to recovery by the innocent insured, produces inequitable results." Id.
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F.
Supp. 543, 547 (D. Colo. 1982). The court suggested:
Mere family relationship to the arsonist, which does not bestow a prop-
erty right or other direct financial benefit in the proceeds of insurance,
does not bar a recovery. Here the only benefit to the arsonist is an indi-
rect one whereby his spouse and children recover what the spouse and
children had already owned and insured. The wrongdoer has no gain,
advantage or recovery of what he owned prior to the fire.
Id.
194. See Schoenig, supra note 156, at 901.
While the ... theory "mitigates the harshness and inequities of the other
... theories," it has been criticized as being "too overprotective of the
marital relationship." Further, it may invite collusion between the hus-
band and wife and "create the virtually insurmountable obstacle of prov-
ing both the arson of one spouse, and the conspiracy between spouses in
order to defeat recovery in the first instance." Even if complicity is sus-
pected, however, "the alleged innocence of the innocent spouse will
probably go u..cha.c. gc urcss tuheic Is diic proof of coiiusion." The
difficulty of proving spousal complicity and the threat of litigation for
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commit arson. 95 Insurers, however, by carefully phrasing the exclusionary
language of contracts, successfully denied claims of co-insureds.'9 These
policies included language that voided the entire policy whenever fraudu-197
lent or negligent actions of "an" or "any" insured were present. Many
courts found such language clear and unambiguous and have barred re-198
covery of the proceeds of insurance. Essentially, the issue of divisible
interests versus divisible liability was reduced to a question of contract
construction. Policies stating that the fraudulent or negligent acts of "the"
insured were deemed ambiguous (recall the court's comment in Howell
that the policy language was ambiguous), while policies referring to the
acts of "an" or "any" were deemed not ambiguous.
When faced with the ambiguous use of "the" insured in the exclu-
sionary language, courts began applying the rule from Hoyt, reading the
contract terms to mean "what a reasonable person in the position of the
insured would have understood them to mean."2°° Courts determined
that an ordinary person would believe that the exclusion denied coverage
only to "the" insured that committed the fraud.20' Thus, the exclusion was
195. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 870.
196. See Dolcy v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 315-16
(R.I. 1991).
197. See Karp, supra note 157, at 12; Schoenig, supra note 156, at 900.
198. See, e.g., Osbon v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (La.
1994). Courts have denied coverage to the innocent co-insured, holding the un-
ambiguous use of "an" or "any" in the policy definitions made clear that obliga-
tions were joint. See, e.g., Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa
1990); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
199. See Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993).
200. Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121, 123 (N.H. 1942).
201. See Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953,
955 (Tex. 1986). The court held that:
This test will best protect the insurance company from fraud while assur-
ing that the insurance company will not be unjustly enriched. It will also
permit an innocent victim whose property has been destroyed to collect
under any insurance policy for a loss reasonably expected to be covered.
This test also avoids the imputation of criminal action to an innocent vic-
tim.
Id.; see also Lindahl, supra note 155, at 442. Lindahl points out that courts have
been split as to whether "the" insured is ambiguous or not. See id. Some courts
have held that the term "the" unambiguously refers only to the insured that actu-
ally commits the fraud, thus allowing policy awards to the innocent co-insured. See
id. According to Lindahl, other courts have arrived at the same result, by holding
the word "the" insured to be ambiguous. See id. Since courts will interpret am-
biguous terms in the manner most favorable to the insured, innocent co-insureds
have prevailed where the court held "the" insured to be ambiguous. See id.
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202
limited to "the" insured guilty of fraud or negligence. However, where
the exclusion read "an" or "arX'," courts found no ambiguity and held the
policy to be valid on its face. This dual approach reflects the current
treatment of innocent co-insured law in much of the United States.0 4
However, recent decisions in Michigan, Louisiana, Georgia and Minnesota
have taken innocent co-insured law in a new direction.
2 0
C. The Statutory Analysis Approach
1. Other Jurisdictions
Between 1943 and 1951, virtually every state in the U.S. adopted a
statutory fire insurance policy.2°6 In Morgan v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., the
Michigan Supreme Court looked to the state's statutory fire policy for
guidance in holding for an innocent co-insured whose estranged husband
set fire to their home during the pendency of their divorce. The court
ruled that the theory asserted by the insurance company required the
unlikely assumption that the legislature intended to impose a duty of sure-. 208
tyship upon each of the insureds. The statutory policy read:
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss,
the insured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any mate-
rial fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the sub-
ject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case of
209
any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
The defendant insurance company argued that the innocent wife's
claim was barred because she and her husband owned inseparable inter-
ests in the subject property. The insurer asserted that, given their ten-
ancy by entireties, the fraud of the husband must be imputed to the
202. See Hoyt, 29 A.2d at 123 ("Whether the rights of obligees are joint or sev-
eral is a question of construction. .. ").
203. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 593; McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289. But see Osbon,
632 So. 2d at 1160-61 (finding "an" in the contract unambiguous, but holding the
contract unenforceable as contrary to state statute).
204. See Shoenig, supra note 156, at 899.
205. See Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Osbon,
632 So. 2d at 1159-60; Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 267
(Mich. 1994).
206.S &=~ !r-I O;N PROPERzi, Iiis. LAw ThaR7 AND !NS. PRACTICE SEUVlON, SU-
pra note 9, at 3.
207. See Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53,54 (Mich. 1981).
208. See id.
209. See id.; see also MiCH. COMP. LAws § 500.2832 (1990) (repealed 1992).
210. See Morgan, 307 N.W.2d at 53.
[Vol. 26:2
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss2/4
LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSES
wife. Rejecting the defendant's theory, the court remanded the case to
the lower court for reformation of the policy and for award of the policy
212benefits to the innocent spouse.
In its decision, the court limited its former stance on one important
issue, and reversed its position on another. Prior to Morgan, the Michigan
Supreme Court had barred recovery by co-insureds, noting that "[a]
breach caused by intentional destruction is chargeable to both insureds
and precludes recovery by the innocent joint insured. " 2 13 The court fur-
ther stated that "[w]e no longer consider the application of the theory of
implied suretyship appropriate in insurance law."2 14 Michigan courts had
215
embraced the theory of imputed suretyship since 1884. Explaining the
change, the court commented:
To adopt the reading [of the statutory fire policy] of the insurer
would require ascribing to the Legislature an intent to impose a
mutual obligation of suretyship on each of several persons in-
sured: that each insured must not only undertake to forbear
from fraud himself, but must also undertake to prevent each of
the other persons insured from engaging in fraud on pain of
losing all interests under the policy. Such intent is unlikely; as
this case aptly illustrates, an insured often has no control over
the conduct of others.16
In 1990, the U.S. District Court in Michigan followed a similar analy-
sis and interpreted the policy language as failing to meet the minimum
protection required by statute. " At issue in Ponder v. Allstate Insurance Co.
was a policy exclusion that read in part, "policy is void if any insured per-
son intentionally conceals or misrepresents any material fact or circum-
stances, before or after a loss." 2 1a As previously noted, the use of "any" in-
sured in the exclusionary text had been held unambiguous in several
219earlier rulings. Here, the court chose not to concern itself with the
211. See id.
212. See id. at 55.
213. Id. at 54 (citing Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 865, 866
(Wis. 1959)).
214. Id.
215. See Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 18 N.W. 797, 804 (Mich. 1884)
("The attempt to defraud the company by any one of the insured, by the making
of false affidavits in relation to loss, is a complete bar to a recovery upon the pol-
icy.").
216. Morgan, 307 N.W.2d at 55.
217. See Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
218. Id. at 61.
219. See, e.g., Spezialetti v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that a homeowner's policy barred recovery to the innocent
spouse where the policy exclusion included the phrase "any insured." The court
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question of ambiguity. The statutory policy used the word "the," which
the Morgan court already held indicated severable interests.2 2 0 Applying
Michigan law, specifically Morgan, the district court ruled that the effect of
the use of "any" insured was to place the plaintiff co-insured beneath the
221
minimum required coverage under the statute. The court again re-
formed the contract and awarded the policy benefit to the innocent co-
insured.2 2
The Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the Ponder court's statutory
interpretation of the statute in Borman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."
2
In this 1994 decision, the Borman court stated:
We hold that the provisions of the insurance policy issued by de-
fendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., insofar as they deny
coverage to an insured who is innocent of wrongdoing by an-
other insured, are inconsistent with the provisions of the stan-
dard policy, and, thus, contrary to the provisions of the standard
policy, and are therefore void insofar as fire insurance coverage
is involved.n4
In Georgia, the law evolved in similar fashion. In Richards v. Hanover
Insurance Co. the state supreme court applied the ambiguity rule to a pol-
icy exclusion for acts of "the" insured and held in favor of the innocent co-
insured plaintiff.225 Five years later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Georgia law, found in favor of an insurer where the contract as-
serted that the policy was void if "an" insured has: 1) intentionally con-
cealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; 2) engaged in
fraudulent conduct; or 3) made any false statements relating to the insur-
ance. The court based its ruling on the clear and unambiguous nature
227
of the contract.
Finally, in 1994, the Georgia Court of Appeals followed Michigan's
statutory approach in a matter of first impression and held that a policy
denying coverage to an innocent co-insured fell below the minimum stan-
found this to unambiguously mean that all insureds were barred from recovery if
any of them caused the damage).
220. See Morgan, 307 N.W.2d at 55; Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d
334, 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
221. See Ponder, 729 F. Supp. at 62.
222. See id.
224. Id.
225. See Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563-64 (Ga. 1983).
226. See Sales v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir.
1988).
227. See id. at 1386.
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dard established by statute. In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dean, the
court considered whether an insured's concealment of material facts
should bar recovery by a co-insured.229 The court noted that the statutory
policy:
[R]equires fire insurance policies covering Georgia property
contain language at least as favorable to the insured as the ap-
plicable portions of the standard fire policy... [and that] [t]he
applicable portion of the Standard Fire Policy provides that
[t]his entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a
loss, the insured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the
subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case
of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
9
23
Interestingly, the Georgia statute itself had been found ambiguous in
231 232
Richards, but the policy at issue in Dean was found to be unambiguous.
Thus, the question for the Dean court was whether an unambiguous con-
tract was required by law to be reformed in conformance with an admit-
tedly ambiguous form. The court held that, ambiguous or not, the stan-
dard policy established a minimum level of coverage beneath which an• . 233
insurance policy could not fall. Finding that the policy at issue fell be-
neath that level, the court held for the plaintiff co-insured.
9 4
2. Minnesota
The evolutionary process in Minnesota began in 1987 in Hogs Unlim-
ited v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.92 5 Here, the co-insureds were
236business partners rather than husband and wife. When one of the part-
ners intentionally killed off the livestock belonging to the partnership, the
237
insurer refused to pay policy proceeds to the innocent partners. The
language of the policy matched verbatim the Minnesota standard fraud
228. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 437-38 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994).
229. See id. at 437.
230. Id. at 438.
231. See id. at 437 (citing Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563-64
(Ga. 1983)).
232. See Dean, 441 S.E.2d at 437-38.
233. See id. at 438.
234. See id.
235. See Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 381
(Minn. 1987).
236. See id. at 382.
237. See id. at 383.
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provision, including the phrase "the insured. " 2 38 Noting that many courts
found the phrase "the insured" to be ambiguous, the court relied on legis-239
lative intent to determine the phrase's meaning. The court stated:
We agree with Plaintiffs position.... We do not think the legis-
lature intended to visit the blame of the errant insured on co-
insureds who, having no control over the unauthorized con-
duct, are themselves blameless; nor do we think the legislature
intended to make insureds their brother's keeper under penalty
of losing their own insurance protection.240
The court held that "the insured" in the statutory policy refers to the
insured guilty of the fraud and therefore can only refer to the same type.. 241
of insured in an insurance policy41 Ultimately, the court awarded policy
benefits to the innocent partners.
In 1993, the issue of innocent co-insureds again was addressed in
Reitzner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.4s The Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals considered language that purported to void the policy to any and all
insureds where one insured "causes or procures a loss to property covered
"244
under th[e] policy for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits.
The court noted that the trend toward allowing innocent insureds to re-
cover insurance benefits "where a loss is caused by the wrongful acts of
other insureds" is permitted when an insurance policy does not "forbid
coverage for innocent insureds."245 The court affirmed the lower court's
findin& that the policy was clear and unambiguous and held for the in-
surer.
238. See id. at 384.
239. See id. at 384-85.
240. Id. at 384.
241. See id. at 384-85.
242. See id. at 386.
243. 510 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). The Reitzner court discussed
whether an innocent insured is entitled to insurance proceeds when one insured
"intentionally causes loss to the property." See id. at 22-24.
244. Id. at 22.
245. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
246. See id. Interestingly, Reitzner argued that the language of the Standard
Statutory Fire Policy should control. See id. As an assignee of a contract for deed
of the subject property, Reitzner alleged that as a contract for deed vendor he
shoul d be t ated as a mortgagee. See id. if Reitzner were treated as a mortgagee,
then Minnesota Statute section 65A.01, subdivision 3 (the Minnesota Standard
Statutory Fire Insurance Policy) would allow him to recover for the intentional acts
of the insured. See id. While seemingly accepting the gravamen of Reitzner's ar-
gument, the court noted that the statute spoke only of mortgagees and not con-
tract for deed vendors. See id. at 24-25.
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D. The Current State of the Law in Minnesota
Finally in 1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed Michigan
precedent in Watson v. United Services Automobile Ass'n. 2 47 The facts in Wat-
248
son follow the typical pattern. Mr. and Mrs. Watson were in the process^ .249
of purchasing a mobile home on a contract for deed. After some years
of marriage, the couple separated and Mrs. Watson left the home. 250 Two
weeks prior to the fire in the Watsons' home, Mrs. Watson sought and re-
ceived dissolution of the marriage, but the decree was not filed until sev-
251
eral days after the fire.
After the Watsons filed a loss report, the insurer, United Services
Automobile Association (USAA) advanced the Watsons $10,000 pursuant
to their insurance policy. Later, when USAA's investigation determined
that the fire had been set intentionally, it denied further proceeds underS253
the policy. Mrs. Watson sued for the remainder of the policy benefits,
while USAA counterclaimed for return of the $10,000 advance. At trial,
the jury, by special verdict, found that Mr. Watson intentionally set the
fire.
The trial court concluded that the arson voided the Watsons' insur-
ance coverage and awarded USAA costs and disbursements from Mr. Wat-
256
son but not from Mrs. Watson. It based its finding on the language of
the policy, which excluded coverage for "any loss arising out of any act
committed: 1) by or at the direction of an insured; and 2) with the intent
to cause a loss. "257 The policy exclusion continued "[t] he entire policy will
be void if 'an' insured has ... after a loss, willfully and with intent to de-
fraud, concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance re-
lating to this insurance." The court stated that it was "compelled to fol-
low Minnesota precedent,"2 5 9 but noted its regret at its finding and urged
reversal on appeal.26 The trial court further stated that allowing USAA to
247. 566 N.W.2d 683, 689 (Minn. 1997).
248. See Cerven, supra note 8, at 855-56; Lindahl, supra note 155, at 435-37.




253. See id. (stating that the second investigation was prompted by Mrs. Wat-




257. Id. at 685-86.
258. Id. at 686.
259. Id. (quoting Reitzner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 20, 24
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
260. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 686 ("[T] he district court stated that it had en-
tered judgment in favor of USAA 'reluctantly' and urged reversal on appeal.").
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escape coverage for Mrs. Watson would amount to "a gross miscarriage of
j• .c . 261justice."
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the trial262
court's finding that the terms of the policy were unambiguous. None-265
theless, the appellate court reversed the judgment. The appellate court
reasoned that the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy compelled ruling for
Mrs. Watson.2 A The court noted that in Hogs Unlimited, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that use of "the insured" in an exclusionary
provision referred only to the insured that had actually committed the
fraud.265
The court also discussed Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
which held that insurers might not provide less coverage than is required
266
by the statute. Ultimately, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded
that, in light of the statutory policy language, USAA could not deny cover-
age to Mrs. Watson.267
On final appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the matter
in a two-step process. First, the court examined whether the policy lan-
guage was ambiguous, and second, it determined whether the policy
complied with Minnesota Statutes section 65A.01. 268 In the first part of
261. Id. at 686-87.
262. See Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 551 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) [hereinafter Watson I].
263. See id. at 504.
264. See id. at 502 (citing Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); Osbon v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1994)).
265. See id. at 502 (citing Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401
N.W.2d 381, 384-85 (Minn. 1987)).
266. See id. at 503 (citing Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d
204, 209 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
267. See id. at 503. The court acknowledged that the Hogs Unlimited court had
not addressed the issue currently before the court. See id. at 502. In addition to
holding that the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy limited fraud provisions to denial
only of the claims of the insured who committed the fraud, the Hogs Unlimited
court also stated that an innocent insured may recover "unless forbidden by the
insurance contract." Id. at 502-03 (citation omitted). The Watson Hcourt admitted
that "[t]his appears to indicate that an insurer could by the terms of the policy
deny coverage for an innocent insured." Id. at 503. However, finding this lan-
guage in direct conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Krueger,
which held that insurers cannot provide less coverage than required by the statu-
tory policy, the court resolved the conflict in favor of the insured. See id. The
court explained its decision by reasoning that in Hogs Unlimited, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reviewed the legislature's intent in creating the standard policy
a•d Ctcr CU Uat .puII pUlILy ,fvusaiuwbl a g .. Uw1ag. IdC., see aUso Hog s
Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 384. The court also noted that "an innocent insured has
a reasonable expectation of coverage," thereby deciding in favor of Mrs. Watson.
See Watson II, 551 N.W.2d at 503.
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the analysis, the court noted that the national trend had been to apply the
"contract-based theory."269 The court recalled that it followed this ap-
proach in Hogs Unlimited when it held that the term "the insured" was am-
biguous, and that by that same analysis the appellate court held in Reitzner270
that "any insured" and "an insured" were not ambiguous terms. Follow-
ing the contract-based theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that USAA's policy "unambiguously bars coverage for innocent co-insured
",271
spouses.
This conclusion did not end the court's inquiry. The court used the
'statute-based theory" in deciding the second part of the analysis, which
requires that "[i]f the exclusion of coverage contained in the insurance
policy conflicts with the level of protection provided in the statutory stan-
dard fire insurance policy, the court will hold the insurance policy unen-
forceable. " 272 The court acknowledged that Hogs Unlimited left open the
possibility that insurers intentionally could exclude innocent co-insureds
when the court stated that innocent partners might recover "unless for-1 i,,273
bidden by the insurance contract. The court reasoned that neither
that court, in Hogs Unlimited, nor the appellate court in Reitzner, was pre-
sented with the "conflict between an insurance policy and the Minnesota
Standard Fire Insurance Policy."
274
Analyzing the legislative intent of the Minnesota Standard Fire Insur-
ance Policy, the court quoted Heim v. American Alliance Insurance Co., not-
ing that the purpose of the statute was to "do away with the evils arising
from the insertion in policies of conditions ingeniously worded which re-
stricted the liability of the insurer and gave the insured less protection
than he might naturally suppose he was getting under the contract."
275
The court went on to cite the statute's conformity clause, which read:
No policy or contract of fire insurance shall be made, issued or
delivered by any insurer.., on any property in this state, unless
it shall provide the specified coverage and conform as to all
269. See id. at 688 (noting that this approach "focuses on a contractual analysis
of... insurance policy provisions").
270. See id. at 689 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 385-86; Reitzner v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
271. Id.
272. Id. (noting that the statute-based theory is applied in other jurisdictions,
citing Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Osbon v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (La. 1994); Borman v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Mich. 1994)).
273. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 690 (citing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386).
274. Id. (discussing Hogs Unlimited, 401 N.W.2d at 386; Reitzner, 510 N.W.2d at
24).
275. Id. (quoting Heim v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 283, 287, 180
N.W. 225, 226 (1920)).
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provisions, stipulations, and conditions, with such form of pol-
icy, except as provided in ... statutes containing specific re-
quirements that are inconsistent with the form of this policy.
The court then noted that Krueger allowed insurers to substitute addi-
tional or different terms in their policies, but only so long as they offered,. 277
the same or greater coverage than the statutory 
policy.
The USAA policy contained an "intentional loss" exclusion, yet there
is no parallel provision in the statutory policy.27s The court determined
that USAA's "intentional loss" provision, insofar as it excluded coverage
for innocent co-insured spouses, was at odds with the rights and benefits-. 279
of the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy. The court affirmed
the appellate court's ruling, holding that the term "the insured" in the
statutory policy indicated the legislature's intent that innocent co-insuredse , 280
receive policy benefits in spite of the wrongful acts of others. Thus, it is
settled law in Minnesota that, by operation of statute, innocent co-
insureds cannot be denied policy benefits on the basis of contractual ex-
clusions.
IV. ARGUMENT FOR SIMILAR TREATMENT OF MORTGAGEES
Minnesota historically has applied a contract analysis approach to de-. . 281
termine whether loss payable clauses are standard or simple. This ap-
282
plication once was the case with innocent co-insureds as well. However,
by closely reading the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy and
276. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 1 (1998)).
277. See id. (citing Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 204, 209
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). The Watson court also noted that the standard statutory
policy permitted such variations of form so long as the policy "afford[ed] the in-
sured all the rights and benefits of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy."
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 1 (1998)). Minnesota statute section
65A.01, subdivision 1 speaks specifically to the mortgagee clauses defined in subdi-
vision 3, stating that, "the provision in relation to mortgagee interests and obliga-
tions in said Minnesota standard fire insurance policy shall be incorporated
therein without change...." MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 1 (1998).
278. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 691.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 691-92.
281. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, 329 N.W.2d 805, 809-10
(Minn. 1983); H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401, 405-
06, 19 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1945); Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 Minn.
146, 151, 20AQ TW 816,Q 8Q 192611 Bast.. Ca: T.A.-... r'... CQ Y.T NAT OA3 OA
26-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
282. See Amick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 862 F.2d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1988);
Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Minn.
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Minnesota Statute section 65A.01, the Minnesota Supreme Court moved
beyond the contract analysis method.283  The Watson Court recognized
that denying coverage to innocent co-insureds because of fraudulent or
negligent acts of a co-insured would place the innocent co-insured be-
284
neath the minimum coverage required by the statute. In adopting the
statutory approach, the court departed from the contract analysis ap-• . 285
proach to innocent co-insureds. This same reasoning should be applied
by analogy to innocent mortgagees. As with innocent co-insureds, the
language in the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy should control. The stat-
ute states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this policy, if this policy
shall be made payable to a mortgagee or contract for deed vendor of the
covered real estate, no act or default of any person other than such
mortgagee or vendor or the mortgagee's or vendor's agent or
those claiming under the mortgagee or vendor, whether the
same occurs before or during the term of the policy, shall render
this policy void as to such mortgagee or vendor nor affect such mort-
gagee's or vendor's right to recover in case of loss on such real es-
tate. ... '86
This portion of the statute arguably renders ineffective Minnesota's
traditional simple loss payable form, when applied to secured loss payees
such as mortgagees. Restated, the statutory policy holds that:
1) Notwithstanding, any other provision of the policy (any other
terms or language to the contrary);
2) if this policy shall be made payable to a mortgagee (any mort-
gage holding loss payee);
3) no act or default of any person (fraudulent or negligent act of
the insured)
4) shall render this policy void as to the mortgagee
5) nor affect such mortgagee's right to recover (including subject-
ing it to the insurer's defenses against the wrongful acts of the in-
sured) .287
Hence, the distinction between simple and standard loss payee
clauses becomes moot in cases where the named loss payee holds a mort-
283. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 690.
284. See id. at 691.
285. See id. at 689.
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288
gage to the insured property. Even if the mortgagee is identified as a
simple loss payee in the contract and would otherwise be subject to the
same defenses as the insured under the traditional loss payee theory, the
fact that the contract is payable at all to the mortgagee places the contract
under the controlling language of the statute. By the express terms of
the statute, "no act or default of any person" (including the insured) shall
affect the mortgagee's right to recover.
Policy language purporting to deny coverage to "any" insured on the
basis of the acts of another insured places co-insureds beneath the mini-
mum required coverage. Similarly, identifying a mortgagee as a simple
loss payee, with only those rights derivative of the insured and subject to
the same defenses as the insured, places the mortgagee beneath the291
minimum required coverage. Yet Krueger made clear that no fire insur-
ance policy may provide less coverage than that afforded by the statutory
policy. 29  Thus, the effect of the statute is clear-mortgagees are to be
protected from perils, including the wrongful acts of the insured.
2 9 3
It is important to recall that the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy is
somewhat unique in this regard. While virtually all states have incorpo-
rated standard fire policies based on the New York form,294 very few con-
tain the express language protecting mortgagees found in the Minnesota295
statute. Essentially, all states' standard policies include the standard or
mortgage loss payee clause; they generally do so only in requiring a notice
to the mortgagee of the insurer's intent to cancel the policy (generally for
non-payment of premium by the insured). 296 This statutory obligation of
notice to the mortgagee becomes the basis of the contractual relationship
between the mortgagee and the insurer, entirely independent of the rela-
288. See id. By definition a simple loss payable clause makes the policy payable
to the named loss payee. See id. Thus, if the named loss payee is a mortgagee, the




291. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 691; see also MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3
(1998).
292. See Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
293. See MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3.
294. See COMMrrEE ON PROPERTY INS. LAW TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, su-
pra note 9, at 3.
295. See Dwyer & Barney, supra note 27, at 5; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
38a-307 (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3404 (McKinney 1985).
296. See, e.g., N.Y. iNS. LAw § 3404 (McKinney 1985) (stating oniy that [iiIjf ioss
hereunder is made payable, in whole or in part, to a designated mortgagee not
named herein as the insured, such interest in this policy may be cancelled by giv-
ing to such mortgagee a ten days' written notice of cancellation") (emphasis
added). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-307 (West 1992) (stating the text of
the New York standard form verbatim).
[Vol. 26:2
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss2/4
LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSES
tionship between insured and insurer, which supports the standard loss
payable clause. 7
However, if statutory policies rely solely on the insurer's duty of no-
tice to create the standard loss payable clause, it also routinely requires
that the mortgagee must be identified for the notice requirement to ap-
298
ply. This is what makes it possible for policies to incorrectly identify
mortgagees as simple loss payees in so many jurisdictions. If the lender
is not designated as a mortgagee in the policy declaration, the insurer has
300
no duty to notify the mortgagee of its intent to cancel the policy. With
no independent duty flowing from the insurer to the mortgagee, no priv-
ity and therefore no basis for an independent contract between them ex-
ists.3
01
Minnesota also requires that the lender be designated as mortgagee
in order for the duty of notice to apply.3 ° The statute requires that:
If loss hereunder is made payable, in whole or in part, to a des-
ignated mortgagee or contract for deed vendor not named
herein as insured, such interest in this policy may be canceled
297. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 84-85.
298. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 3404 (McKinney 1985). Mississippi is one of
the few states, in addition to Minnesota, that includes an express mortgage
clause in its statutory policy. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-9 (1998). It includes
the following language:
Loss or damage, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to (here insert
name of party), as mortgagee (or trustee), as interest may appear, and
this insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee (or trustee) only
therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or
owner of the within described property, nor by any foreclosure or other
proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor by any change
in the tide or ownership of the property, nor by occupation of the prem-
ises for purposes more hazardous than are permitted in this policy; and
in case the mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due
under this policy, the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the
same.... This company reserves the right to cancel this policy at any
time as provided by its terms, but in such case this policy shall continue
in force for the benefit only of the mortgagee (or trustee) for thirty (30)
days after notice to the mortgagee (or trustee) of such cancellation and
shall then cease, and this company shall have the right on like notice to
cancel this agreement.
Id.
299. See supra notes 53-54.
300. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 3404 (McKinney 1985).
301. See 45 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 595, 638 (1993); 4 COUCH, supra note 7, § 65:24;
3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.0211]; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1,
at 83.
302. SeeMINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3 (1998).
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by giving to such mortgagee or contract for deed vendor a ten
days' written notice of cancellation.3 O3
However, this provision is not Minnesota's sole basis of the insurer's duty
to the mortgagee. The standard policy continues, "[n]otwithstanding any
other provisions of this policy, if this policy shall be made payable to a
mortgagee or contract for deed vendor...." 104 The words "notwithstand-
ing any provisions" give this clause preeminence over the preceding
clause, which, for purposes of the notice requirement for intent to cancel,
insists that the mortgagee be so designated. The latter clause includes
no such requirement. It merely requires that the policy be "made pay-
able" to a mortgagee. Thus, if a mortgagee, whether identified or not,
is listed in any manner as a loss payee, the statute dictates that such mort-
gagee is not subject to the defenses of the insurer against the wrongful
acts of the insured.3 s
When such a case comes before a Minnesota court in the future, the
court must abandon the precedents of Allen, Shepherdson, Young and
Bast. 3 W The contract theory analysis no longer should be applied since it
can yield results contrary to Minnesota Statute section 65A.01.31 0 Follow-
ing the outcomes of Kruegei' and Watson,312 the court must look to the
313
statute for guidance. If insurance proceeds are made payable in any
manner to a mortgagee, whether so identified in the policy declaration,
the court is constrained by the statutory fire policy to read the contract as
314
including a standard loss payable clause.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Id. (emphasis added).
305. The term "notwithstanding" means "without prevention or obstruction
from or by; in spite of." WEBSTER'S 3RD NEw INTERNATiONAL DICrIONARY 1545 (3d
ed. 1993).
306. See MINN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3 (1998).
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Young, 329 N.W.2d 805, 811
(Minn. 1983); H.F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401, 405-
06, 19 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1945); Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 Minn.
146, 150, 208 N.W. 816, 818 (1926); Bast v. Capital Indem. Corp., 562 N.W.2d 24,
27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
310. See 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.02[3].
11~~~~~~~~ Qtz-=g-; Cvxal~ ' . -,a ., 51.0 N'.WV.2d 20-1,20 k'O winn. Gi.
App. 1993).
312. See Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn.
1997).








315Protecting interests in insurance benefits has evolved over time.
The courts developed differing strategies to resolve questions of insurerS . 316
liability to third parties and to multiple-named insureds. In addition to
the question of coverage, i.e., who may benefit under an insurance policy,
questions remain as to when and under what circumstances such parties
317
legally are entitled to the policy proceeds.
Courts have struggled with several issues when an innocent third
party, or an innocent co-insured is denied coverage under the policy. For
third party beneficiaries, particularly lender-mortgagees, the loss payable
clause evolved.3 's Traditionally, where the courts have found a contractual
relationship between mortgagee and insurer, the mortgagee's interests
have been deemed independent of the insured's rights. Thus, even if
the policy is held void as to the insured, the mortgagee remains pro-
520tected. Conversely, where no privity is found between mortgagee and
insured, the mortgagee is held to "stand in the shoes" of the insured and
is subject to the same defenses the insurer has against the insured. l In
this situation, the mortgagee recovers only if the insured recovers first.
Recent Minnesota cases and cases in other states have taken a statu-
tory approach to the similar question of whether innocent co-insureds
should recover when another insured acted in violation of express policy
323
terms. Where the language of the policy was found to place the co-
insured beneath the minimum insurance coverage required by statute,
such terms were nullified and the innocent co-insured was permitted to
324
recover.
315. See supra Parts II, III.
316. See supra Parts II, III.
317. See generally 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01 (describing
the evolution of loss payable forms); Cerven, supra note 8, at 851 (addressing the
various approaches the courts have taken concerning the problem of innocent co-
insureds).
318. See RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 473; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 82.
319. See 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1404 (1993); 5A APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra
note 33, § 3401; 4 COUcH, supra note 7, § 65:9 n.36; 3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, su-
pra note 6, § 52.01 [1]; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83.
320. See Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at 83.
321. See 4 CoucH, supra note 7, § 65:9 n.36.
322. See 45 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 595, 638 (1993); 4 CoucH, supra note 7, § 65:24;
3 INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 52.01; Steinmetz et. al., supra note 1, at
82.
323. See Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Osbon
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 632 So. 2d 1158, 1159-61 (La. 1994); Borman v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Mich. 1994); Watson v. United
Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 1997).
324. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 691.
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A close reading of the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy indicates that
courts in this state should take the same approach toward mortgagees.25
Minnesota law requires that policies of insurance afford no less coverage,. 326
than that outlined in the statutory policy. The Minnesota statutory pol-
icy states that when a policy is made payable to a mortgagee, no act of any
person (including the insured) shall void the policy as to the mort-327
gagee. Thus, when a mortgagor is required by the terms of a mortgage
agreement to procure property insurance payable to the mortgagee and
the mortgagor-insured later violates the terms of the policy, the policy
must be read to include a standard mortgage clause. 328 When faced with
the problem of a mortgagee misidentified in an insurance policy as a sim-
ple loss payee, the Minnesota courts should follow the statutory analysis
used by the Watson court.3
29
325. S ..M .... STAT .. ,A 01 R 100Q\
326. See id. subd. 1; Krueger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 510 N.W.2d 204,
209 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
327. See MRNN. STAT. § 65A.01, subd. 3.
328. See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 691.
329. See id. at 689-91.
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